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THE BLOCKBUSTER PUNITIVE DAMAGES AWARDS
W. Kip Viscusi*
ABSTRACT
This paper provides an analysis of sixty-four punitive damages
awards of at least $100 million. Based on an inventory of these
cases, there is evidence that these blockbuster awards are highly
concentrated geographically, as two states account for twenty-seven
of the sixty-four awards. The awards also have been rising
substantially over time, with the majority of these blockbuster awards
taking place since 1999. An assessment of the current status of the
blockbuster punitive damages awards indicates that most of these
awards have been appealed, but the reversal of these punitive
damages awards is the exception rather than the rule. Many large
punitive damages awards are settled without any appeal. The ratio
limits outlined in State Farm v. Campbell will affect over ninety
percent of the blockbuster awards and over 90% of the damages
associated with these awards if a ratio of 1.0 becomes the upper limit
on punitive damages.
INTRODUCTION
Punitive damages represent the most visible symptom of the ills of the U.S.
tort system. Because of the magnitude of punitive damages, headlines often
tout the levels of penalties being imposed and the economic horrors that could
result from such awards. Such accounts do not, however, provide a reliable
indication of the magnitude of punitive damages awards. To provide a
perspective on the frequency and amount of the large punitive damages
awards, this paper provides a comprehensive inventory of what I term the
"blockbuster" punitive damages awards and the ultimate economic costs that
they impose.
* Cogan Professor of Law and Economics, Harvard Law School. Research for this Article is supported
by the Harvard Olin Center for Law, Economics, and Business and the Harvard Program on Empirical Legal
Studies. Stephanie Lockwood provided superb research assistance. Paul Rubin provided excellent comments,
as did Saviprasad Rangaswamy.
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Punitive damages have attracted the interest of tort reformers for good
reason. Much of the concern with respect to punitive damages stems from the
imprecise guidance that juries are given in setting the award levels. A recent
series of experimental studies have examined the way in which these awards
are set as well as a variety of shortcomings of jury behavior.' Punitive
damages instructions seldom give jurors precise numerical guidance that they
2
can use in setting the damages amount. Moreover, sometimes there is a
tendency among jurors not to follow the specific instructions they are given.
3
Even if one were to provide jurors with specific numerical guidance to assist
them in setting punitive damages awards-such as the use of the optimal
deterrence theory implicit in law and economics principles-jurors either
cannot or will not embrace such a methodology.4
The positive aspect of jury behavior is that jurors appear to be quite capable
of reaching a consensus with respect to whether a particular behavior is
morally blameworthy. The difficulty arises when jurors must then translate
their moral outrage toward wrongful conduct into a dollar amount. The
inability of jurors to carry out this task successfully leads to much greater
variability in award levels than in jurors' assessment of the blameworthiness of
the behavior.
The result is a series of shortcomings in jury decisionmaking that are
difficult to overcome. Decisions regarding liability and recklessness may be
seriously flawed. Jurors may be subject to a variety of hindsight biases making
them unable to take themselves back to the pre-accident situation in assessing
whether the defendant has been reckless and punitive damages are warranted.
5
Jurors also appear to be quite ill-suited to undertake the kind of broad based
national benefit-cost analysis that is needed to assess whether the appropriate
balance between risk and cost has been struck for mass-marketed products.
6
For a compilation of many of these studies, see CASS R. SUNSTEIN ET AL., PUNITIVE DAMAGES: How
JURIES DECIDE (2002).
2 Id. at 259-60 (providing representative jury instructions, which are qualitative in character).
3 Id. at 77-93 (documenting the general failure of jurors in experimental contexts to abide by
instructions).
4 Id. at 132-170; see also W. Kip Viscusi, The Challenge of Punitive Damages Mathematics, 30 J.
LEGAL STUD. 313, 342-43 (2001).
5 Reid Hastie et al., Juror Judgments in Civil Cases: Hindsight Effects on Judgments of Liability for
Punitive Damages, 23 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 597, 609-11 (1999); W. Kip Viscusi, How Do Judges Think
About Risk, 1 AMER. LAW & ECON. REV. 26,46-55 (1999).
6 SUNSTEIN ET AL., supra note 1, at 228-33; W. Kip Viscusi, Corporate Analysis: A Reckless Act, 52
STAN. L. REV. 547, 550-51 (2000).
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Jurors may also be subject to anchoring effects whereby plaintiffs' attorneys
suggest plausible, but possibly irrelevant, dollar anchors to create a focal point
for jury decisionmaking and to boost the value of the award.7
Very large punitive damages awards are the target of many punitive
damages reform efforts because of their potentially damaging economic
consequences. These extremely large awards sometimes run into the billions
of dollars and are highly unpredictable. As a result, these large awards do not
have a deterrent effect because the penalties for wrongful conduct are not
anticipated. Indeed, empirical evidence suggests that there is no significant
safety incentive effect from punitive damages.8 Large awards may also tend to
depress innovation and deter the introduction of new, but risky, products that
might expand the scope of the business' liability. On an empirical basis,
increasing the level of liability costs in an industry initially increases
innovation but eventually has a negative depressing effect.9 Moreover, as
emphasized by Rubin, Calfee, and Grady, the level of punitive awards and the
contexts in which these large penalties generate economic consequences are
generally harmful to consumer interests. o
A potential rebuttal to these concerns is the claim that such awards are
highly predictable, rather than unpredictable.'1  Moreover, according to
advocates of punitive damages, the award levels that garner the headlines may
not be an accurate reflection of the ultimate cost of these major punitive
damage awards. If these awards are reversed on appeal, for example, then the
economic cost will be reduced, perhaps even eliminated in particular cases.
The focus of this Article is on the blockbuster awards and on their ultimate
implications for the costs imposed on defendants. This Article will not delve
into issues such as whether punitive damages awards are set appropriately by
jurors or whether they have beneficial or harmful effects on the economy.
7 Viscusi, supra note 6, at 562-63.
8 See W. Kip Viscusi, The Social Costs of Punitive Damages Against Corporations in Environmental
and Safety Torts, 87 GEO. L.J. 285, 288-99 (1998); W. Kip Viscusi, Why There Is No Defense of Punitive
Damages, 87 GEO. L.J. 381,381-82 (1998).
9 See W. Kip Viscusi & Michael J. Moore, Product Liability, Research and Development, and
Innovation, 101 J. POL. ECON. 161, 164 (1993).
10 Paul H. Rubin et al., BMW v. Gore: Mitigating the Punitive Economics of Punitive Damages, 5 S. CT.
ECON. REV. 179, 188 (1997).
1 For an interesting exchange on this predictability issue, compare Theodore Eisenberg et al., The
Predictability of Punitive Damages, 26 J. LEGAL STUD. 623 (1997), with A. Mitchell Polinsky, Are Punitive
Damages Really Insignificant, Predictable, and Rational? A Comment on Eisenberg et al., 26 J. LEGAL STUD.
663 (1997).
2004]
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Rather, the emphasis will be much more focused on developing an inventory of
the blockbuster awards and their ultimate disposition.
This Article begins with a comprehensive inventory of what I call the
"blockbuster" punitive damages awards. Whereas $1 million awards used to
generate media coverage for a substantial award, we now live in an era in
which there may be award levels of a billion dollars or even more. This
Article uses a punitive damages award of $100 million for identifying
blockbuster awards. I identified sixty-four awards equal to or exceeding this
amount as of April 2004.
In addition to simply tallying these various awards, it is useful to explore
how the distribution of these awards varies with different matters of concern.
Are, for example, judges just as likely to award such blockbuster punitive
damages awards as are juries? Are these awards predictable based on the level
of compensatory damages in the case? Is there a trend in such blockbuster
award levels, or have they always been a standard feature of the legal
landscape? Are particular venues responsible for most of the awards, or are
they uniformly distributed throughout the United States?
After examining these issues, I will then examine the current status of these
awards. In particular, to what extent are these awards currently under appeal?
Have many of these awards been settled or overturned by the courts?
Finally, I will examine the effect of the U.S. Supreme Court decision in
State Farm v. Campbell12 on blockbuster awards. That decision provided the
most concrete guidance to date on the reasonable ranges for punitive damages
awards. To what extent will the guidance provided by the U.S. Supreme Court
in this decision constrain blockbuster awards? In that regard, it will be
interesting to compare how the various numerical guidelines the Court
provided on the permissible ratio of punitive damages to compensatory
damages will affect the blockbuster awards as compared with punitive
damages awards more generally.
Overall, there has been an explosive growth in punitive damages awards of
$100 million or more as well as a substantial increase in the number of billion
dollar punitive damages awards. State Farm has the potential to have a
dramatic effect on the overwhelming majority of these punitive awards and on
the total economic costs they impose.
12 State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408 (2003).
[Vol. 53
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I. INVENTORY OF THE BLOCKBUSTER AWARDS
This Article focuses on the blockbuster-level punitive damage awards that
are at least $100 million. 13 Although there is nothing unique about the $100
million cutoff, it does make the inventory of large punitive damage awards
much more manageable than would a lower cutoff of, for example, $1 million.
Moreover, it is these very extreme punitive damages awards that receive the
greatest media attention and serve as the focal point for liability reform efforts.
An award in this range was also the subject of the State Farm case, recently
considered by the U.S. Supreme Court.
The nature of the search undertaken by Joni Hersch and myself involved an
extensive review of a wide variety of available sources. The search included
LEXIS combined jury verdicts and settlements, a variety of Westlaw
databases, articles in American Lawyer, major newspapers, and the Google
search engine. In all, there were sixty-four punitive damages awards that met
the $100 million cutoff. The first such award was in 1985, but the search was
not limited to awards starting at that date. Rather, the search process simply
did not identify any awards that met the $100 million cutoff before 1985. The
search also includes all awards identified through April 2004.
Table 1 provides a listing of these sixty-four blockbuster awards and some
of their principal case characteristics for bench trials and for jury trials. The
first column of the table lists the case name and the state in which the award
was made. The second column gives the year of the decision. The third
column gives the level of the punitive damages award. The cases appear in
increasing order of the magnitude of the punitive damages award. The final
column of the table calculates the ratio of punitive damages to compensatory
damages. While there is no specific numeric value that such a ratio should
hold in order to be an appropriate punitive damages award, the U.S. Supreme
Court frequently discusses the reasonableness of punitive damages awards in
terms of this ratio and has recently provided guidance with respect to what the
appropriate ratio should be.
14
13 See Joni Hersch & W. Kip Viscusi, Punitive Damages: How Judges and Juries Perform, 33 J. LEGAL
STUD. 1, 6 tbl. 1 (2004). The inventory provided in Table I of this Article updates Table 1 in the Journal of
Legal Studies article. It also extends that analysis to consider the subsequent disposition of these awards.
Cases not cited in the text of this Article can be found in Table 1. Only appellate decisions will be cited to
footnotes.
14 State Farm, 538 U.S. at 424-25.
2004]
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The top panel of Table 1 summarizes the awards that were the result of
bench trials, while the bottom panel of the table gives the punitive damages
awards levied by juries. Only three of the sixty-four cases that appear in Table
1 were the result of bench trials. Overall, juries accounted for over 95% of all
cases in which there was a punitive damages award of at least $100 million.
This greater relative role of juries in awarding substantial punitive damages
is consistent with the statistical analyses of a large sample of state court data
from 1996 by Hersch and Viscusi.15 That article used the 1996 Civil Justice
Survey of State Courts data, controlling for case characteristics and venue, to
show that juries were more likely to award punitive damages than were judges
and that juries were also likely to award a greater amount of punitive damages.
The most apparent differences were at the extreme high end of the punitive
damages spectrum, as juries were responsible for the largest awards. There
were few differences between judges and jurors in terms of awarding low and
moderate levels of punitive damages. This greater relative role of juries with
respect to very large punitive damages awards is consistent with the findings in
Table 1, in which juries play a dominant role. The jury share of blockbuster
punitive damages cases is also greater than the fraction of cases handled by
juries rather than bench trials. 16
Large corporate defendants appear frequently in this list of blockbuster
cases. The cigarette industry has been particularly noteworthy in making a
number of appearances, which notably excludes the $240 billion settlement of
the state cases against the tobacco industry.17 That huge settlement amount
and the attendant publicity may, in part, have served as an anchor for
subsequent punitive damages awards in the billions.'
8
The largest bench trial award in Table 1 is for a class action case, Price v.
Philip Morris, Inc.,19 in which there were claims that smokers of light
cigarettes were the victims of the fraud that, in the view of the plaintiffs, light
cigarettes were represented by the manufacturers as being safer than
conventional cigarettes. This class action took place in Madison County,
Illinois, which some observers have suggested is a haven for plaintiff-oriented
15 See Hersch & Viscusi, supra note 13.
16 Id. at 9.
17 For discussion of the settlement and its costs, see W. KIP ViscUsi, SMOKE-FILLED ROOMS: A
POSTMORTEM ON THE TOBACCO DEAL (2002).
'8 Id. at 58.
19 This case was formerly Miles v. Philip Morris, Inc.
[Vol. 53
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class actions. 20  This $10.2 billion total damages award required that the
company post a $12 billion bond during the appeal, which created problems for
the defendant. The Illinois Supreme Court cut the bond amount to $6 billion
and agreed to hear the company's appeal directly, rather than allowing the case
to go to the appellate court. 2  Thus, the large stakes of these cases may affectthe feasibility of defendants' options.
Four of the jury trials listed in Table 1 also involved cigarette industry
defendants, and one was a class action. Individual smoker cases led to punitive
damages awards of $150 million in Schwarz v. Philip Morris, Inc., $3 billion in
Boeken v. Philip Morris, Inc., and $28 billion in Bullock v. Philip Morris, Inc.
In addition, the Florida class action of Engle v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. led
to a $145 billion punitive damages award in that state.
Cases involving automobile companies are also prominently represented.
The listing of jury awards includes three cases in which the defendant was
General Motors, one case in which the defendant was Ford, and one case in
which the defendant was Chrysler. In addition, tire manufacturers and
companies that provide insurance for automobile accidents have also been the
target of these major awards. Motor vehicle travel poses well-known, often
inherent, risks.
A third major cluster of cases involves companies that engage in the
production of gasoline and chemicals. Some of these cases involve
environmental damages claims, as in the Exxon Valdez oil spill case against
Exxon, whereas others involve contract disputes of various kinds. As in the
cases of the tobacco industry and the automobile industry, the large stakes
involved in these companies' operations coupled with the fact that the products
provided involve some inherent elements of risk often make these entities a
target for blockbuster punitive damages awards.
20 Nicknames for Madison County, Illinois, include "The Lawsuit Capital of the World" and "Class-
Action Paradise." Amalia Deligiannis, Madison County: A Corporation's Worst Nightmare, 14 CORP. LEGAL
TIMES 52 (2004). The American Tort Reform Association (ATRA) issued a report in 2003 in which Madison
County, Illinois was named the number one "Judicial Hellhole" and a "jackpot jurisdiction." AMERICAN TORT
REFORM ASSOCIATION, BRINGING JUSTICE TO JUDICIAL HELLHOLES 2003, at 3 (2003), available at
http://www.atra.org/reports/hellholes/report.pdf; see also Sue Reisinger, Shell Oil's Hefty Settlement: A
Harbingerfor MTBE Defendants, 12 CORP. LEGAL TIMES 54 (2002) (providing another example of Madison
County's reputation).
21 John Flynn Rooney, Witnesses Take Sides on Limiting Appeal Bonds, CHI. DAILY L. BULL., Jan. 27,
2004, at 1; see Michael Bologna, Illinois Courts Consider Appeal Bond Rules Following Landmark Philip
Morris Decision, 33 BNA PRODUCT SAFETY & LIABILITY REP. 133, 134 (2004).
20041
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After each case listed in Table 1, there is an indication of the state in which
the award was made. Table 2 summarizes the distribution of these awards by
state, where the states are ordered in terms of the number of blockbuster
punitive damages awards that appear in Table 1. California and Texas head
the list-twenty-seven of the sixty-four punitive damages awards in the table
are from these two states. Other venues-such as Alabama, Illinois, and
Mississippi-that have developed a reputation for being sympathetic to
plaintiffs also make an appearance on this table.
The third column in Table 2 lists the dollar magnitude of these awards,
which are then converted into punitive damages per capita in the final column
of Table 2. Florida leads all states in terms of the magnitude and per capita
value of punitive damages, owing almost entirely to the huge award in Engle v.
R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., which accounts for $145 billion of the $145.7
billion in total punitive damages awards in the blockbuster cases in that state.
If we exclude the effect of this outlier, California ranks first in terms of
punitive damages totals, followed by Arkansas and Texas. In terms of the
punitive damages amount per capita, Florida is followed very closely by
Arkansas, with the next cluster of punitive damages values from California,
Louisiana, and Alabama.
Even with the large populations in California and Texas, one cannot make
the case that blockbuster punitive damages awards are a random event with
equal probability in every state. The population of New York is more than half
that of California and larger than that of any other state in Table 2, but New
York has never had a blockbuster punitive damages award. In fact, there are
thirty-two states that have never had a punitive damages award in excess of
$100 million.
The second column in Table 1 lists the year of the decision leading to the
blockbuster award, ranging from 1985 to 2003. Table 3 breaks down the
distribution of these time periods into five-year intervals to explore whether
there are trends among these punitive damages awards. The number of awards
per time period clearly has been on the rise. Just over half of the punitive
damages awards listed in Table 1 took place from 1999 to 2003. Many of the
remainder were decided in 1994 to 1998.
However, the trend in the magnitude of awards does not rise steadily, in
part because of the lumpy nature of some very large awards. The pre-1989
period exhibited a total award amount in excess of that from 1989 to 1993 due
to the influence of the $3 billion punitive damages award in Pennzoil Co. v.
[Vol. 53
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Texaco, Inc. However, over 90% of all the blockbuster punitive damages
award amounts took place from 1999 to 2003. This total is strongly influenced
by a particular outlier, the $145 billion award in Engle v. R.J. Reynolds
Tobacco Co. However, even excluding the influence of Engle, the most recent
time period would exhibit the highest blockbuster punitive damages award
total. The general sense that extremely large punitive damages awards are
increasing in frequency and increasing in total value is certainly borne out by
the evidence.
The final three columns of Table 1 list the punitive damages award amount,
the compensatory damages award amount, and the ratio of punitive damages to
compensatory damages. A key concern in the literature has long been the
extent to which compensatory damages are a predictor of the level of punitive
damages and, in particular, whether the damages ratio indicates a reasonable
relationship within a particular award.22 From the standpoint of the law and
economics theory of optimal deterrence, there should be a strong link between
the punitive damages award and the compensatory damages award, whereby
the total of all damages should equal the compensatory damages value divided
by the probability that there will be detection of and liability found for the
wrongful conduct.23 Punitive damages ratios have played a prominent role in
pronouncements by the U.S. Supreme Court with respect to the reasonableness
of punitive damages amounts.
24
A longstanding statistical concern in the literature has been whether the
level of compensatory damages are predictive of the value of punitive
damages. It should be emphasized that this "predictability" overstates the
degree of predictability that the defendant would have at the time the defendant
engaged in the wrongful conduct. The defendant does not know whether the
wrongful conduct will in fact lead to a finding of liability and any
22 See Eisenberg, supra note 11 (discussing the relationship between compensatory and punitive
damages); Polinsky, supra note 11 (same).
23 A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, Punitive Damages: An Economic Analysis, 11l HARV. L. REV.
869, 874-75 (1998).
24 See BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559 (1996). The Court remarked that "perhaps [the] most
commonly cited indicium of an unreasonable or excessive punitive damages award is its ratio to the actual
harm inflicted on the plaintiff." Id. at 580 (citation omitted); see also Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499
U.S. 1 (1991) (finding that a ratio of four to one is not constitutionally improper). But see TXO Prod. Corp. v.
Alliance Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443 (1993) (affirming a judgment in which punitives were over 526 times the
actual damages).
25 See Eisenberg, supra note 11 (discussing the relationship between compensatory and punitive
damages); Polinsky, supra note 11 (same).
2004]
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compensatory damages award and whether there will also be a punitive
damages award. Thus, any analysis of predictability that focuses on the
relationship between the observed punitive damages amount and compensatory
damages award will be conditioned on the presence of a compensatory
damages award and a punitive damages award. This comparison overstates the
knowledge defendants have at the time they engaged in the wrongful conduct
that led to the punitive award. In practice, defendants do not know in advance
that there will be a compensatory award and the amount of this award. Nor are
they aware that there will be a punitive damages award given the
unpredictability of these awards.
Table 4 summarizes two sets of regression results linking punitive damages
to compensatory damages. The first set of results in Panel A is a simple
regression of the punitive damages value against a constant term and the
compensatory damages value, where the sample used for this analysis excludes
Engle v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. because the compensatory damages award
for the class representatives reflects a different scope of damages than are
reflected in the punitive damages award for the entire class. In terms of the
linear specification in Panel A, there is no statistically significant relationship
between compensatory damages and punitive damages. Indeed, this variable
has no explanatory power in a simple regression, with an adjusted R-squared
that is negative.
The specification in Panel B regresses the log of punitive damages against
the log of compensatory damages. The logarithmic transformation mutes the
effect of outliers with respect to punitive damages. Once this transformation is
done, there is a weak but statistically significant relationship between the log
of compensatory damages and the log of punitive damages, which explains 6%
of the variation in the log of punitive damages.
The coefficient of the log of compensatory damages, which is statistically
significant, has a convenient interpretation as well. The coefficient of 0.163
implies that for every 10% change in compensatory damages levels the value
of the punitive damages award will increase by 1.63%. Thus, the elasticity of
the response of punitive damages to the level of compensatory damages is
relatively low for blockbuster cases.
These empirical estimates do not imply that it is impossible to develop a
statistical model that is predictive of the level of punitive damages. As was
discussed earlier, many of the largest awards are concentrated among
industries that sell tobacco products, automobiles, and gasoline and other
[Vol. 53
HeinOnline  -- 53 Emory L.J. 1414 2004
THE BLOCKBUSTER PUNITIVE DAMAGES AWARDS
chemicals. Firms in these industries or other deep pocket enterprises are more
heavily represented in the blockbuster awards sample, especially at the high
end. However, the question being addressed here is not whether one could
increase the explanatory power of the punitive damages equation by simply
adding other explanatory variables to the equation. That the explanatory
power of the models could be increased by doing so certainly is the case.
However, the key result is that the relationship between the level of
compensatory damages and punitive damages is very weak for the blockbuster
awards sample. Moreover, it also should be emphasized that even this limited
statistical explanatory power is not tantamount to the award being predictable
by the defendant before the wrongful conduct, as firms do not know in advance
whether compensatory damages will be awarded and, if so, what their level
will be.
II. THE CURRENT STATUS OF THE BLOCKBUSTER AWARDS
The actual level of punitive damages awards may potentially misrepresent
the economic effect of such awards in two principal ways. These awards may
be reduced on appeal or settled for a lesser amount, thus diminishing their
economic impact. An opposite effect is that major awards may induce parties
to settle cases before the punitive damages award is levied, thus inducing a
potential understatement of the total economic cost associated with large
punitive damages awards.
To determine the extent that the punitive damages awards are reflective of
significant economic damages actually being paid, Table 5 provides a
summary of the current status of all the blockbuster punitive damages awards
listed in Table 1. This table numbers the cases for ease of reference in
subsequent breakdowns of the different case dispositions. This summary relies
on publicly available information and was undertaken in much the same
manner as was the compilation of the original case list in Table 1.26 In some
instances, the status of a case has not been resolved, as the case may still be
under appeal. In other instances, there may be information that the case
settled, but no information on the actual amount of the settlement. It is
noteworthy that such nondisclosure of the settlement amount appears to be the
norm for such settlements, as almost every settlement was for a confidential
26 See generally infra Table 5. The one exception is Amoco Chemical Co. v. Certain Underwriters at
Lloyd's of London. That case's disposition is based on information obtained at the listed website. Email from
website author (Feb. 29, 2004) (on file with author).
2004]
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amount, and for those in which the amount is not entirely confidential, often
the best available information is an estimated settlement range. For two of the
cases there is no information that I have been able to identify regarding their
current status.
To organize the overall flow of these sixty-four cases, Figure 1 provides a
diagrammatic summary of cases listed by number from Table 5 in terms of the
process that they underwent following the original punitive damages award.
The first category lists cases in which the defendant filed an appeal, but this
category includes thirty-nine of the sixty-four cases listed in Table 1. Among
the cases that were appealed, ten were reversed, an additional three cases were
reversed and subsequently led to an out-of-court settlement with the parties,
and one case was reversed and is now under appeal.
The most prominent of these reversed cases is Engle v. R.J. Reynolds
Tobacco Co." This $145 billicn punitive damages class action was not
included in the regression analysis linking punitive damages to compensatory
damages because the compensatory damages in this case amounted to only
$12.7 million for the class representatives, whereas the $145 billion punitive
damages award was for the entire class. This mismatch between the scope for
calculating compensatory damages and punitive damages is not only a problem
for statistical analysis but also creates problems for judicial assessment of the
appropriateness of such a punitive damages award. In particular, the calculated
ratio of punitive damages to compensatory damages based on the available
information regarding punitive damages and compensatory damages was
11,417, but what the ratio would be if the compensatory award reflected
compensatory damages for the entire class cannot be determined.
In its decision overturning the punitive damages award, the court made a
similar observation:
Establishment of this reasonable relationship requires a prior
determination of the compensatory damages caused by the alleged
misconduct. See Op. Att'y Gen. Fla., 2000 WL 329587 (Fla. A.G.
2000) ("[I]n the absence of any determination of the extent of
compensatory damages, the court lacks a standard by which it can
judge whether an assessment of punitive damages is reasonable or is
grossly excessive."). 28
27 This case was reversed by Liggett Group Inc. v. Engle, 853 So. 2d 434 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003).
28 Id. at451.
[Vol. 53
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Without this prior determination, any comparison between a punitive award
and the "actual harm" is impossible. For this reason, federal and other state
courts have repeatedly held that compensatory damages must be tried before
punitive damages.
The court also observed that the $145 billion punitive damages award was a
record-breaking amount that was too great to be permitted:
This trial produced the largest punitive damage verdict in American
legal history. As acknowledged by even the plantiffs' purported
experts, the $145 billion punitive award will extract all value from
the defendants and put them out of business, in violation of
established Florida law that prohibits bankrupting punitive awards.
29
The next category of cases in Figure 1 consists of punitive damages cases
in which the verdict was affirmed. This category consisted of two cases from
Table 1, one of which was subsequently appealed. These affirmed cases had
ratios of punitive damages to compensatory damages of 4.6 and 1.3.
The third category of cases consists of cases currently under appeal. The
five cases in this category have been appealed, but there has not yet been a
court decision.
The fourth category of cases listed in Figure 1 consists of those in which
punitive damages have been reduced. In three cases, the appeal led to a
reduction in punitive damages, which was not subsequently appealed and did
not lead to an out-of-court settlement. In five cases there was a reduction of
punitive damages and either a current appeal or a possible or pending appeal in
the case. Three cases in which punitive damages were reduced led to a
settlement. For the cases in which the appeal led to a reduction in punitive
damages, the amount of punitive damages remained substantial even after the
appeal. The award in Forti v. General Dynamics Corp. was reduced to $30
million, well below its earlier value of $100 million and yielding a punitive to
compensatory damages ratio of 4.1. The $124.57 million punitive award in
Proctor v. Davis and Upjohn Co. was reduced to $6.1 million, yielding a ratio
of 1.9. The appeals court in Romo v. Ford Motor Co. reduced that $290
million award to a ratio of 5.0. This case was subsequently settled by the
parties for $23.7 million.30 The appeals process yielded a punitive damages
29 Id. at 456.
30 Ford To Pay $23.7 Million To Rollover Plaintiff After $290 Million Punitive Award Is Tossed, 33
BNA PRODucr SAFETY & LIABILITY REP. 126 (2004) [hereinafter Ford To Pay].
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award of $300 million (ratio of 1.3) in Hayes v. Courtney, $100 million (ratio
of 18.0) in Boeken v. Philip Morris, Inc., $850 million (ratio of 425) in In re
New Orleans Tank Car Leakage Fire Litigation, $1.09 billion (ratio of 10.1) in
Anderson v. General Motors Corp., and $28 million (ratio of 43.1) in Bullock
v. Philip Morris, Inc.
With the exception of this final individual smoker case, every reduction of
a $1 billion punitive damages award has failed to result in an award under
$100 million. One possibility is that the large initial award does in fact reflect
more serious harm and greater degrees of reckless behavior. An alternative
hypothesis is that very large jury awards have an anchoring effect in the
subsequent appeals process, thus providing a reference point for the punitive
damages amounts that will be set after being reduced by the appeals court.
Four of the appeals have led to retrials, and in one case there was a new
verdict. This new verdict case, Exxon Corp. v. Department of Conservation
and Natural Resources, is noteworthy in that it illustrates that obtaining a new
trial as the result of an appeal may not always be to the defendant's advantage,
even in situations where the initial ratio of punitive damages may appear to be
excessive. This case involved an accounting dispute between Exxon and the
State of Alabama. The original punitive damages award was $3.4 billion,
which led to a ratio of punitive damages to compensatory damages of 39. As a
result of the retrial, the jury lowered the compensatory damages amount from
$87.7 million to $63.6 million. However, the jury increased the punitive
damages award from its earlier level to $11.9 billion.3 1 The new punitive
damages to compensatory damages ratio of 185.5 is more than four times as
great as the original punitive damages ratio that was under appeal. In March,
2004, the trial judge reduced the punitive award to $3.5 billion, resulting in a
punitive to compensatory ratio of 55. 2
The next category in Figure 1 pertains to cases that were settled. In all,
twenty-two cases were settled, but this tally includes Case 59, In re New
Orleans Tank Car Leakage Fire Litigation, which appears as a settled case for
all but one defendant and as a case that-for one of the defendants in the
case-led to an appeal, a reduction in punitive damages, and a subsequent
31 Susan Warren, Exxon Verdict Reflects Wider Anger. Judgment of $11.9 Billion in Alabama
Underscores Distrust of Companies, WALL ST. J., Nov. 17, 2003, at A6.
32 Thaddeus Herrick, Judge Cuts Verdict Against Exxon in Alabama Case, WALL ST. J., Mar. 30, 2004, at
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appeal. Thus, this is the only case in Figure 1 that appears in two different
locations.
The settlement amount in these cases is difficult to compare to the initial
punitive damages award. For fifteen of the twenty-two cases the settlement
amount is confidential. In one instance, Rubicon Petroleum, Inc. v. Amoco
Production Co., the settlement amount is an estimated 10% of the $500 million
verdict. For seven of the twenty-two cases the total settlement amount is
known. However, the split of the settlement amount between punitive
damages and the allocation for compensatory damages is not known. There
were settlement values of $60 million for Tennessee Gas Pipeline v. KCS
Resources, Inc., $7.5 million for The Robert J. Bellott Insurance Agency, Inc.
v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., $20 million for Fuqua v.
Horizon/CMS Healthcare Corp., $242 million for Igen International, Inc. v.
Roche Diagnostics GmbH, and $23 million for Beckman Coulter, Inc. v.
Flextronics International Ltd.
The final categories in Figure 1 include one case that was reduced by the
trial judge, two cases in which there has been no payment made to the plaintiff
and no appeal of the case, and two cases for which there is no information
available. One of the no-payment cases, Perez v. William Recht Co., involved
defendants that are out of the business. The second no-payment case involves
a fugitive killer who has been extradited from France to the United States, but
there is no payment that has yet been made in Maddux v. Einhorn.
The overall pattern that emerges from Figure 1 is that the disposition of the
blockbuster punitive damages awards does not fit any single simple pattern,
such as for each case appealed, the verdict is reversed or reduced to modest
levels. Many cases are appealed, but many of these are settled, and even in
cases in which the punitive damages are reduced, the damages often remain
substantial. In addition, a considerable share of cases are settled out-of-court
before any appeal, and larger punitive damages awards tend to increase the
bargaining power of plaintiffs in any such negotiation. Because almost all
these settlements are confidential, it is difficult to assess their ultimate
economic effect. However, publicized settlement amounts are as high as $3
billion, as in Pennzoil v. Texaco, and while courts reduce punitive damages
awards by billions of dollars, the result is often still over $100 million. The
stakes remain considerable, even if not the original blockbuster amount.
20041
HeinOnline  -- 53 Emory L.J. 1419 2004
EMORY LAW JOURNAL
III. THE EFFECT OF STATE FARM V. CAMPBELL
The 2003 U.S. Supreme Court decision in State Farm Mutual Insurance
Co. v. Campbell3 3 potentially imposes the greatest structure to date on punitive
damages. Whereas the Court previously had not specified a ratio of punitive
damages to compensatory damages that was ideal, and still has yet to be that
explicit, this recent decision did attempt to bring some discipline to setting
punitive damages and did so by indicating ranges of acceptable ratios.
The main target that has emerged is that of single-digit ratios: "Our
jurisprudence and the principles it has now established demonstrate, however,
that in practice, few awards exceeding a single-digit ratio between punitive and
compensatory damages, to a significant degree, will satisfy due process."
34
The Court went on to observe that for the punitive damages award cases in
which there are substantial compensatory damages as well, one would expect
the ratio generally to be much lower than a ratio of 9.0: "When compensatory
damages are substantial, then a lesser ratio, perhaps only equal to
compensatory damages, can reach the outermost limit of the due process
guarantee."
35
Based on these observations as well as related statements in the Supreme
Court decision, the empirical analysis below will focus on the implications of
admissible ratios of punitive damages of 1.0 and 9.0, reflecting the two
different ratios indicated by the Court. These were not, however, the only
ratios discussed, as the decision also commented on other ratios such as treble
damages rules, as well as previous court decisions that permitted ratios greater
than 1.0: "In Haslip, in upholding a punitive damages award, we concluded
that an award of more than four times the amount of compensatory damages
might be close to the line of constitutional impropriety."
36
Despite these various types of numerical guidelines provided by the Court,
there were also exceptions indicated whereby a high punitive to compensatory
damages ratio may not be indicative of an excessive award if compensatory
damages are sufficiently small. 37 It is not clear whether plaintiffs' attorneys
33 538 U.S. 408 (2003).
34 Id. at 425.
35 id.
36 Id. (citing Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1 (1991)).
37 See id. In particular, the Court observed: "Nonetheless, because there are no rigid benchmarks that a
punitive damages award may not surpass, ratios greater than those we have previously upheld may comport
[Vol. 531420
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will be successful in claiming that compensatory damages amounts are small in
relationship to the overall harm that has been inflicted, thus avoiding the
limiting effect of the opinion.
The effect of State Farm on these blockbuster punitive damages awards
was almost immediate. The first blockbuster award after this decision was in
Beckman Coulter Inc. v. Flextronics International Ltd. That case led to a
punitive damages award of $931 million, which had a punitive to
compensatory damages ratio of 321. Within two months after this verdict, the
parties settled the case for $23 million.38 The case involved a compensatory
damages amount of $2.9 million so that a settlement of $23 million implies an
approximate punitive damages settlement value of $20.1 million, for a ratio of
punitive damages to compensatory damages of 6.9. This value is within the
U.S. Supreme Court guidelines of an upper-limit single-digit ratio, whereas the
original ratio of 321 would be clearly inconsistent with the Court's guidelines.
The decision and the appeal of Romo v. Ford Motor Co.3 9 also took place
after State Farm and was strongly influenced by the guidance provided in that
case. The original punitive to compensatory damages ratio was 54.7. The
California Court of Appeal made repeated references to State Farm in
overturning the original punitive damages award. Included among the
observations of the court were the following:
First, we conclude State Farm's constitutionalization of the historical,
pre-Grimshaw punitive damages doctrines as part of federal due
process means that the jury was fundamentally misinstructed
concerning the amount of punitive damages it could award in the
present case .... Accordingly, plaintiffs' counsel argued that the
award should be large enough to force Ford to recall all remaining
1978-1979 Broncos still on the road and "crush them to dust."
Counsel argued that $1 billion was the appropriate award, based on
the profit Ford made on all 1978-1979 Broncos, factored to reflect
Ford's use of that money over the next twenty years. Finally, counsel
requested $1 billion so the resulting publicity would reach all
remaining owners of this model Bronco so they would know how
dangerous the vehicle was. These considerations are impermissible
under State Farm and plaintiffs' arguments served to magnify the
with due process where 'a particularly egregious act has resulted in only a small amount of economic
damages."' Id. (quoting BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 582 (1996)).
38 Scott Thurm, Flextronics Will Pay $23 Million to Beckman To Settle a Lawsuit, WALL ST. J., Nov. 28,
2003, at B3.
'9 113 Cal. App. 4th 738 (2003).
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impact of the misinstruction . . . For reasons described above, we
do not believe that the deathly harm component of the punitive award
in the present case is strictly constrained by the single-digit multiplier
set forth in State Farm. Nevertheless, we note the overall punitive
damages award we find appropriate after independent review,
$23,723,287, is approximately five times the total compensatory
damages award in this case.40
Why the Romo Court adopted a ratio of 5:1 rather than some other ratio is not
clearcut. While the court did discuss reasons for diverging from a 1:1 ratio,
there is no explicit guidance given in State Farm that would enable any court
or jury to map their concerns into a particular punitive ratio above one but not
exceeding nine. The parties subsequently settled this case for $23.7 million.
41
Interestingly, in the appeal of the Exxon Valdez oil spill case that took place
after State Farm, the importance of the punitive damages/compensatory
damages ratio in conjunction with the limits imposed by State Farm led to a
dispute over the value of compensatory damages, which is the denominator in
the ratio. Higher values of compensatory damages will make higher values of
punitive damages conform to any given ratio value. The plaintiffs in this case
claimed compensatory damages of $517.2 million, and the defendant claimed
the compensatory damages were $20.3 million. The judge selected a value of
$507 million, with the result being that a $5 billion punitive award would not
exceed a 10:1 ratio.42
If State Farm exerts a disciplinary role, it is likely to constrain some of the
wildest excesses of punitive damages in excess of compensatory damages, so
long as compensatory damages can be reasonably well defined. To the extent
that these and other cases fall into line with the guidance provided by State
Farm, one would expect a potentially dramatic effect on the permitted level of
punitive damages awards.
To examine the effect of the ratio limits of an upper limit of nine and a
lower limit of one for the punitive to compensatory damages ratio, Table 6
presents the influence of such limits for the blockbuster award cases excluding
the class action case Engle v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. In addition, Table 6
also reports the effect of these guidelines on a large sample of state court
punitive damages awards drawn from the Civil Justice Survey of State Courts,
40 Id. at 753-62.
41 Ford To Pay, supra note 30.
42 John W. DeGravelles, Uncertain Seas for Maritime Punitive Damages, TRIAL, Jan. 1, 2004, at 50.
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1996.43 The punitive damages in state courts are much more modest in scale
than the blockbuster awards. The median punitive damages award was
$50,000 in jury trials and $33,000 in bench trials.44 The first ratio limit
indicated in Table 6 is the single-digit ratio of 9.0. If that were the cap on
punitive damages, it would reduce the total blockbuster awards from $70.3
billion to $14.2 billion. Only 20% of the awards and 43% of the cases would
be under that limit. If, however, a ratio limit of 1 were imposed, only 9% of
the awards and 8% of the cases in the blockbuster category would meet the
test.
For the state court sample shown in the final column of Table 6, the ratio
limit of 9.0 is less constraining because the typical punitive damages award in
state courts tends to have a lower ratio than do the blockbuster awards. Thus,
96% of the punitive damages awards in state courts would be under the ratio
limit of 9.0. However, because the larger damages cases tend to fail the test,
only forty-three of the total punitive damages awards meet the test.
If the ratio limit were reduced to 1.0, there would be a much more
constraining effect in terms of the percentage of awards that would be
permitted. The blockbuster awards meeting this cutoff drop to 9% of total
awards and 8% of total cases. There is a similar dramatic effect on the
representative state court sample, as only 6% of the total award amounts are
under a cap of 1.0 even though 71% of the cases met that cutoff.
How different levels of permissible ratio caps would affect the blockbuster
awards is illustrated in Figure 2. This figure explores ratio cap values ranging
from 1 to 20, thus starting at the lower end of the U.S. Supreme Court's
guidelines and going to a value that is more than twice the single-digit ratio
limit. The darker bars in the figure indicate the fraction of cases that will be
under various punitive damages limits. Thus, for any punitive damages to
compensatory damages ratio on the horizontal axis, the dark bars indicate the
fraction of cases that have a punitive damages to compensatory damages ratio
that is not in excess of that value. The fraction of cases that will be below any
given ratio limit rises fairly steadily from under 10% for a limit of 1.0, to about
40% for a limit of 7.0, to over 50% once the limit hits 18.0.
43 The discussion in the remainder of this section uses results calculated using this data set, as discussed
in Hersch & Viscusi, supra note 13.
44 Id.; see id. at 13 tbl.2.
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The light bars in Figure 2 indicate the fraction of total punitive damages
award values in the blockbuster sample that have a punitive damages to
compensatory damages ratio at or below the ratio indicated on the horizontal
axis. The amount of punitive damages awards in the blockbuster category that
will be permitted as the ratio limit is increased is a much flatter relationship
than is the relationship of the fraction of cases to the ratio limit. Thus, close to
10% of the punitive damages award amounts would be permitted with a ratio
of 1.0, and this figure does not reach 20% until a ratio of 9.0. Even if the
permitted ratio is increased to a value as high as 20.0, only 30% of the awards
in the blockbuster category would meet the test. Blockbuster awards by their
very nature tend to be outliers and usually have a high ratio of punitive to
compensatory damages.
It is apparent that almost any reasonable ratio for the blockbuster cases will
have a dramatic effect on the total dollar value represented by the blockbuster
awards that far exceeds its influence on the fraction of cases. The reason for
this relative impact is that the blockbuster awards tend to have a
disproportionate number of cases in which the ratio of punitive damages to
compensatory damages is wildly excessive given the existing guidance of
reasonableness that the courts have provided.
Figure 3 presents analogous effects for the large 1996 sample of state court
awards. Thus, Figure 3 indicates the fraction of cases with punitive award
complying with different permitted ratios and the fraction of total punitive
damages awards represented by cases in compliance with different permitted
ratios. The results for the state court sample indicate that at very low values, a
very large fraction of cases will be under the cap but only a very small portion
of the total punitive awards. These cases are of more modest scale than the
blockbuster cases and often do not have punitive damages awards that do not
exceed compensatory damages, whereas the opposite is true for the blockbuster
cases.
What is most remarkable about the results in Figure 3 is that for the state
court sample, the choice of the punitive damages to compensatory damages
ratio limit has an almost negligible effect on the fraction of cases affected or
the fraction of total damages awards affected for ratios ranging from 8 to 20.
At a permissible ratio near the upper end of the single digit limit, just over 40%
of total punitive damages awards, and over 90% of the cases, would not violate
the constraint. If, however, the U.S. Supreme Court in State Farm had
specified that the upper limit should be 20, then the practical result in Figure 3
[Vol. 53
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for state cases would be unchanged from the guidance they did provide. In
contrast, the fraction of punitive damages awards for blockbuster cases that
would be unaffected by a cap of 20.0 is about 50% greater than the amount that
would be unaffected by a single-digit ratio cap.
The inquiry thus far has focused on the fraction of the blockbuster awards
and state court awards that would meet the test imposed by different values of
the cap. However, the operational significance of a cap, if enforced, is a bit
different. Awards with punitive damages to compensatory damages ratios
under the cap presumably will be unaffected if we can assume that the cap is a
well-defined constraint. Yet, awards in excess of the cap will not simply
disappear. In the previous tallies of punitive damages awards under the cap in
Figures 2 and 3, all punitive awards with ratios above the cap, in effect,
counted as zero. They did not contribute to the share of total award values
currently under the cap. However, if the courts begin to impose cap values, the
practical result will not be that these cases will have no punitive damages.
Some punitive damages values may get reduced or overturned on appeal or
lead to settlements. For concreteness, suppose that the punitive damage
awards in excess of the capped value are reduced to a level so that the cap
constraint is met exactly. Thus, if there were a maximum permitted punitive
damages to compensatory damages ratio of 1.0, the punitive damages amount
in Hedrick v. Sentry Insurance Co. will decrease from its actual award level of
$100 million to $2.17 million, which is the value of compensatory damages in
the case. For a binding ratio cap of two in this case, the punitive award will be
reduced to $4.34 million. Thus, even though the punitive award may violate
higher values of the cap, as the permitted ratio of punitive damages to
compensatory damages is increased, plaintiffs will get to keep more of their
punitive award. Undertaking a similar analysis for all the blockbuster cases
and overall state court cases considered previously, what fraction of total
awards will still be permitted under different cap levels?
Figure 4 illustrates how the fraction of total awards that will be imposed
varies with different punitive damages caps. In each instance a larger share of
the state court sample of awards is imposed irrespective of the value of the cap.
Moreover, both of those award components indicate a steadily rising total
damages cost as the cap is raised. For a cap of 1.0, approximately 13% of the
blockbuster awards and over 26% of state punitive awards will be imposed.
With an upper limit of a ratio of 9.0, 30% of the cost of blockbuster awards
will be imposed and 63% of the state court award cost will be imposed. By the
time the ratio limit equals 20.0, over 87% of the state court award cost and
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about 40% of the blockbuster award cost will be imposed if the cap serves as a
binding constraint.
In each instance, the total award cost that will be imposed as a result of a
cap, as shown in Figure 4, is much more sensitive to the choice of the cap than
is the fraction of all awards that will lie under different values of the cap, as
shown in Figures 2 and 3. The reason for the difference is that in Figure 4
every increase in the value of the cap boosts the amount of punitive damages
that could be levied for all cases above the cap but are now reduced to a value
equal the cap. However, in Figures 2 and 3 the only matter of concern was
which awards were already under the cap rather than how total awards would
change if violators of the cap were brought into compliance with the cap.
CONCLUSION
The blockbuster punitive damages awards have generated substantial
attention in the media and in appellate decisions for good reason. Award
levels in the hundreds of millions of dollars, and with increasing frequency in
the billions of dollars, impose substantial economic costs. In some cases, these
awards could threaten the economic viability of the defendant as a result of
only a single case.
These excessive awards may be concentrated on particular industries, thus
decreasing the viability of firms marketing risky products. Individual cigarette
smoker cases have generated punitive damages amounts of $28 billion,
$3 billion, and $150 million. With an estimated 400,000 smokers dying per
year from smoking-related illnesses, these stakes could become quite
substantial. Tobacco class actions have generated punitive awards of
$145 billion and $7.1 billion.
The actual economic cost of these awards that is ultimately imposed is
almost invariably less than the punitive damages award level. Some of these
verdicts are reduced on appeal, while others are settled for an amount less than
the value of the actual award. However, examination of the current status of
punitive damages awards indicates that it is certainly not true that appeals and
settlements reduce the stakes of these punitive damages awards to an
inconsequential amount. Even awards reduced on appeal can be $100 million
or more.
The punitive damages landscape is likely to be substantially different in the
wake of State Farm. To the extent that punitive damages are not permitted to
[Vol. 53
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exceed the value of compensatory damages, such a ratio will affect more than
90% of total blockbuster award amounts and 90% of all blockbuster award
cases. If, however, the effective punitive damages cap is a single-digit ratio,
there will be less of a constraining effect. Moreover, if plaintiffs are able to
argue successfully that the compensatory damages in their cases are "small" so
that a higher ratio is warranted, then the restraining effect of State Farm will be
diminished.
Suggested ratio caps and other forms of judicial discipline-almost by their
very nature-have some kind of arbitrary element that does not supplant the
need for a rational basis for setting punitive awards. Ultimately, punitive
damages will not function in a constructive manner until either juries are given
instructions that enable them to set punitive damages in a sensible manner or
the responsibility for setting the level of punitive damages is transferred to
judges. The main lesson of the blockbuster awards sample is that, in many
instances, juries have not received the guidance needed to enable them to set
punitive damages in a sensible manner. The result that we observe is punitive
to compensatory damages ratios as high as 1683, leading to punitive damages
amounts in the billions in a situation in which the compensatory damages were
only $2 million.
Experimental studies that have examined the process by which jurors arrive
at these punitive damage verdicts indicate that jurors are susceptible to a wide
variety of biases, such as the influence of possibly irrelevant anchors used to
frame their thinking about punitive damages award amounts. The California
appeals court decision in Romo v. Ford Motor Co. indicates that the State
Farm decision has already led courts to become more attuned to efforts by
plaintiffs' attorneys to provide anchors that would lead juries to make awards
in violation of the guidance of State Farm. Further improvements in jury
instructions that enable jurors to approach punitive damages in a manner
consistent with State Farm will undoubtedly enhance the performance of juries
and reduce the excesses reflected in the blockbuster award amounts. The long-
term task is not only to eliminate the most extreme excesses but also to provide
a workable methodology for setting reasonable levels of punitive damages
awards.
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Table 2: Blockbuster Punitive Damage Awards by State
Punitive Punitive
State Number of Damages 2003 State Damages
Cases ($ Millions) Population per Capita
California 15 39,289 35,484,453 1107
Texas 12 5014 22,118,509 227
Alabama 4 4200 4,500,752 933
Illinois 4 4025 12,653,544 318
Maryland 4 1072 5,508,909 195
Florida 3 145,700 17,019,068 8561
Missouri 3 2220 5,704,484 389
Mississippi 3 687 2,881,281 238
Georgia 3 493 8,684,715 57
Arkansas 2 5150 648,818 7938
Louisiana 2 4365 4,496,334 971
Wisconsin 2 1100 5,472,299 201
Pennsylvania 2 1090 12,365,455 88
South Carolina 1 250 4,147,152 60
Kentucky 1 210 4,117,827 51
North Carolina 1 150 8,407,248 18
Oregon 1 150 3,559,596 42
Utah 1 145 2,351,467 62
Total 64 215,309 160,121,911 1345
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Table 3: Time Trends in Blockbuster Awards
Time Period Number of Total Amount
Awards ($ Millions)
Pre-1989 4 3594
1989-1993 7 1285
1994-1998 19 12,076
1999-2003 34 198,354
Total 64 215,309
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Table 4: Simple Regression Results for Punitive Damages Awards'
Coefficient
(Standard Error)
Panel A: Dependent variable:
punitive damages
Explanatory variables
Compensatory damages 0.271
(0.359)
Constant 1037.328**
(470.015)
Adjusted R-squared -0.01
Panel B: Dependent variable:
log (punitive damages)
Explanatory variables
Log (compensatory damages) 0.163**
(0.073)
Constant 5.284**
(0.270)
Adjusted R-squared 0.06
'Sample is comprised of jury trials from Table 1, excluding Engle v. R.J.
Reynolds Tobacco Co.
** (*) indicates coefficient is significantly different from zero at 1% (5%)
level, two-sided tests.
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Table 6: The Effect of Alternative Punitive Damages Ratio Limits
Total awards
Total cases
Ratio limit=9
Awards amount
Percentage of total awards
Percentage of total cases
Ratio limit=1
Awards amount
Percentage of total awards
Percentage of total cases
Blockbuster
Awards*
$70.3 billion
63
$14.2 billion
20
43
$6.6 billion
9
8
State Court Sample
$246.0 million
171
$104.6 million
43
96
$15.2 million
6
71
*Note: This list of blockbuster awards excludes the class action case, Engle
v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co.
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